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Abstract 
 
The paper presents a reflection on some of the basic assumptions and 
philosophy of reference point approaches, stressing their unique concentra-
tion on the sovereignty of the subjective decision maker. As a new devel-
opment in reference point approaches also the concept of objective ranking 
is stressed, defined as dependent only on a given set of data, relevant for 
the decision situation, and independent from any more detailed specifica-
tion of personal preferences than that given by defining criteria and the 
partial order in criterion space. Rational objective ranking can be based on 
reference point approach, because reference levels needed in this approach 
can be established objectively statistically from the given data set. Exam-
ples show that such objective ranking can be very useful in many man-
agement situations.  
Keywords: multiple criteria optimization and decisions; reference point 
approaches; objectivity and subjectivity in decision support 
1 Introduction 
We shall use here the words subjective and objective not in any derogatory 
sense, but in their original epistemic sense – subjective as resulting from 
personal cognition or preferences, objective as trying to represent outside 
world without bias and presuppositions. Thus, we can say that all contem-
porary decision analysis, aiming at supporting the decision maker in using 
her/his own preferences for selecting best personal decisions, concentrates 
actually on computerized support of subjective decisions. But what means 
computerized support? It should include at least two aspects: 
1)  A computerized representation of knowledge (including data, rules, 
models) about a part of outside reality pertinent for the decision situation, 
which should be as objective as possible;1  
                                                     
1 Full objectivity is obviously, for many reasons, not possible (this is known, e.g., 
since Heisenberg in 1927 has shown that any act of measurement distorts the 
measured quantity). However, we can try to be as objective as possible, by try-
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2)  A computerized support for combining the subjective preferences of 
an individual decision maker with an objective representation of the perti-
nent knowledge in selecting the actual decision. 
In other words, as formulated by (Emery 1987) when describing the 
goals of a DSS (decision support system): 
“A DSS provides computer-based assistance to a human decision 
maker. This offers the possibility of combining the best capabilities of both 
humans and computers. A human has an astonishing ability to recognize 
relevant patterns among many factors involved in a decision, recall from 
memory relevant information on the basis of obscure and incomplete asso-
ciations, and exercise subtle judgments. A computer, for its part, is obvi-
ously much faster and more accurate than a human in handling massive 
quantities of data. The goal of a DSS is to supplement the decision powers 
of the human with the data manipulation capabilities of the computer.” 
Here, however, starts the essential dilemma of decision support: how far 
is it appropriate to supplement the decision powers of the human? There 
are diverse answers to this fundamental question. We could thus distin-
guish two essential ways of combining the subjective preferences with an 
objective representation of the pertinent knowledge: 
I. Modelling the preferences of the decision maker in the computer and 
proposing the resulting, in a sense automated decision for her/his approval; 
II. Consciously foregoing precise modelling of the preferences of the    
decision maker in order to preserve (as far as possible) the sovereignty of 
her/his decisions. 
While there are situations in which the first way is useful (in control en-
gineering, dynamic pricing of tickets, etc.), in a typical decision support it 
is considered as a too far reaching intervention into the sovereign rights of 
a human decision maker. In other words, real decision makers – particu-
larly of higher level that might be considered as master experts in decision 
making, see (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986) – resent automated decisions, do 
not want to reveal their detailed preferences. On the other hand, following 
the second way in an extreme fashion, insisting on a full preservation of the 
sovereignty of human decisions would mean not using decision support at 
all, relying exclusively on the power of intuition of master expert decision 
makers – which also might be desired in some situations, such as stimulat-
                                                                                                                         
ing to falsify every theory or belief, following (Popper 1972). Even if the post-
modern sociology of science denies objectivity and ridicules Popperian falsifi-
cationism, technology includes falsificationism in its everyday practice by 
submitting tools and other technological artefacts to destructive tests in order to 
determine limits of their applicability. See (Wierzbicki and Nakamori 2006, 
2007) and further comments in this chapter. 
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ing creativity, see (Wierzbicki 1997; Wierzbicki and Nakamori 2006) but 
not necessarily in all cases.  
Thus, there is a need to compromise, to find a middle way between the 
extremes of the first and the second way. There might be diverse waysof 
such compromises; one is a progressive elicitation of preferences during a 
computer supported decision process; see (Miettinen et al. 2006). We must 
warn, however, that such progressive elicitation should not be understood 
as leading to a full indentification of preferences – otherwise it would turn 
into full automation of decisions – and that there are diverse approaches to 
such elicitation, depending, between others, on the assumed degree of pre-
serving the sovereignty of the decision maker.  
2 Reference Point Approaches 
Reference point approaches have a long history, see (Wierzbicki 1977; 
1980, 1999, Wierzbicki et al. 2000); however, we shall limit their descrip-
tion here to their fundamental philosophy, a short description of their basic 
features and to some contemporary, new developments related to this class 
of approaches. 
Fundamental Assumptions of Reference Point Approaches 
During almost 30 years development of reference point approaches, includ-
ing their diverse applications, several fundamental assumptions of these 
approaches were clarified, most of them expressing lessons learned from 
practice of decision making. These are: 
1) Separation of preferential and substantive models. This denotes 
the conviction that in a good decision support system should carefully    
distinguish between the subjective part of knowledge represented in this 
system, concerning the preferences of the user, thus called a preferential 
model of the decision situation, and the objective part, representing in this 
system some selected knowledge about pertinent aspects of the decision 
situation –obviously selected never fully objectively, but formulated with 
objectivity as a goal – called a substantive model (sometimes core model) 
of the decision situation. Typically, a substantive model has the following 
general form: 
y = F(x, z, a) (1) 
where: 
♦ y is a vector of outcomes (outputs) yi, used for measuring the conse-
quences of implementation of decisions;  
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♦ x is a vector of decisions (controls, inputs to the decision making proc-
ess), which are controlled by the user;  
♦ z is a vector of external impacts (external inputs, perturbations), which 
are not controlled by the user; 
♦ a is a vector of model parameters; 
♦ F( ) is a vector of functions (including such that are conventionally 
called objectives and constraints), describing the relations between deci-
sions x, impacts z, parameters a, and outcomes y.  
The compact form of (1) is misleading, since it hides the actual       
complexity of the underlying knowledge representation: a large model    
today may have several millions of variables and constraints, even when 
the number of decision and outcome variables is usually much smaller. 
Additionally, the substantive model includes constraint specification 
(symbolically denoted by x є X0) that might have the form of admissible 
bounds on selected model outcomes, or be just a list of considered decision 
options xk є X0, k є K = {1,…k,…K}. While the reference point approach is 
typically described for the continuous case (with a nonempty interior of X0, 
thus an infinite number of options in this set), we shall concentrate here on 
the discrete case, with a finite number of decision options K, for which 
case the reference point approach is equally or even particularly suitable. 
The actual issue of the separation of preferential and substantive models 
is that the substantive model should not represent the preferences of the 
decision maker, except in one aspect: the number of decision outcomes in 
this model should be large enough for using them in a separate representa-
tion of a preferential structure P(x, y) of the user, needed for selecting a 
manageable subset of solutions (decisions) that correspond best to user’s 
preferences. The separate representation of preferential structure can have 
several degrees of specificity, while the reference point approaches assume 
that this specification should be as general as possible, since a more        
detailed specification violates the sovereign right of a decision maker to 
change her/his mind: 
♦ The most general specification contains a selection of outcomes yi that 
are chosen by the decision maker to measure the quality of decisions, 
called typically criteria (quality measures, quality indicators) and denoted 
here by qj, j є J = {1,…j,…J}. This specification is accompanied by defin-
ing a partial order in the space of criteria – simply asking the decision 
maker which criteria should be maximized and which minimized (while 
another option, stabilizing some criteria around given reference levels, is 
also possible in reference point approaches, see Wierzbicki et al. 2000). 
Here we shall consider only the simplest case when all criteria are maxi-
mized. 
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♦ The second level of specificity in reference point approaches is          
assumed to consist of specification of reference points – generally, desired 
levels of criteria. These reference points might be double, including aspi-
ration levels, denoted here by qj
a (levels of criteria values that the decision 
maker would like to achieve) and reservation levels qj
r
 (levels of criteria 
values that should be achieved according to the decision maker). Specifica-
tion of reference levels is treated as an alternative to trade-off or weighting 
coefficient information that leads usually to linear representation of      
preferences and unbalanced decisions as discussed below, although some 
reference point approaches (Nakayama 1995) combine reference levels 
with trade-off information. 
♦ The detailed specification of preferences includes full or gradual identi-
fication of utility or value functions, see, e.g., (Keeney and Raiffa 1976), 
(Keeney 1992). This is avoided in reference point approaches that stress 
learning instead of value identification – according to the reference point 
philosophy, the decision maker should learn during the interaction with a 
DSS, hence her/his preferences might change in the decision making    
process and she/he has full, sovereign right or even necessity to be incon-
sistent. 
2) Nonlinearity of preferences. This denotes the conviction that human 
preferences have essentially nonlinear character, including a preference 
for balanced solutions, and that any linear approximation of preferences 
(e.g., by a weighted sum) distorts them, favouring unbalanced solutions.  
This is in opposition to the methods taught in most management schools 
in diverse versions as the basic approach to multiple criteria decision mak-
ing. These methods consist in determining – by diverse approaches,        
between which the AHP (Saaty 1982) is one of the most developed – 
weighting coefficients wj for all j є J and then aggregating the criteria by a 
weighted sum: 
qJ = ∑j є J wjqj (2) 
with the additional requirement on the scaling of weighting coefficients 
that ∑i є J wi = 1. Such an aggregation might be sometimes necessary, but it 
has several limitations. The most serious between them are the following: 
♦ The weighted sum tends to promote decisions with unbalanced crite-
ria, as illustrated by the Korhonen paradox quoted below; in order to   
accommodate the natural human preference for balanced solutions, a 
nonlinear aggregation is necessary.  
♦ The weighted sum is based on a tacit (unstated) assumption that a 
trade-off analysis is applicable to all criteria: a worsening of the value of 
one criterion might be compensated by the improvement of the value of 
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another one. While often encountered in economic applications, this 
compensatory character of criteria is usually not encountered in interdis-
ciplinary applications.  
The Korhonen paradox is based upon the following example. Suppose 
we select a partner for life and consider two criteria: sex-appeal and intel-
ligence.2 Suppose we have three candidates (options). Candidate 1 has 100 
points for sex-appeal, 0 points for intelligence. Candidate 2 has 0 points 
for sex-appeal, 100 points for intelligence. Candidate 3 has 45 points for 
sex-appeal and 45 points for intelligence. It is easy to prove that when us-
ing a weighted sum for ranking the candidates, candidate 3 will be never 
ranked first – no matter what weighting coefficients we use. Thus, 
weighted sum indeed tends to promote decisions with unbalanced criteria; 
in order to obtain a balanced solution (the first rank for candidate 3), we 
have either to use additional constraints or a nonlinear aggregation scheme. 
Not knowing about the Korhonen paradox but educated in typical man-
agement schools, the legislators in Poland introduced a public tender law. 
This law requires that any institution preparing a tender using public 
money should publish beforehand all criteria of ranking the offers and all 
weighting coefficients used to aggregate the criteria. This legal innovation 
backfired: while the law was intended to make public tenders more     
transparent and accountable, the practical outcome was opposite because 
of effects similar to the Korhonen paradox. Organizers of the tenders soon 
discovered that they are forced either to select the offer that is cheapest and 
worst in quality or the best in quality but most expensive one. In order to 
counteract, they either limited the solution space drastically by diverse side 
constraints (which is difficult but consistent with the spirit of the law) or 
added additional poorly defined criteria such as the degree of satisfaction 
(which is simple and legal but fully inconsistent with the spirit of the law, 
since it makes the tender less transparent and opens hidden door for graft). 
This recent practical experience shows that we should be very careful 
when using weighted sum aggregation. In short summary, a linear 
weighted sum aggregation is simple mathematically but too simplistic in 
representing typical human preferences that are often nonlinear; using this 
simplistic approach resulted in practice in adverse and unforeseen side-
effects. 
3) Holistic perception of criteria. The third basic assumption of refer-
ence point approaches is that the decision maker selects her/his decision 
using a holistic assessment of the decision situation; in order to help 
                                                     
2 This paradox was not officially published, since in the original formulation of it 
in diverse discussions, Pekka Korhonen used another name for the second     
criterion: ability to cook. 
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her/him in such holistic evaluation, a DSS should compute and inform the 
decision maker about relevant ranges of criteria change. Such ranges can 
be defined in diverse ways, while two of them are basic: 
♦ Total ranges of criteria involve the definition of the lower bound qj
lo 
and the upper bound qj
up, over all admissible decisions, for all all j є J.  
♦ Efficient ranges of criteria establish also the lower bound and the    
upper bound, but counted only over Pareto optimal (nondominated, effi-
cient) decisions. The upper bound is called in this case (of all maximized 
criteria) the utopia point or ideal point qj
uto
 and is typically equal to qj
up
; 
the lower bound is called in this case the nadir point qj
nad. Generally,   
qj
nad ≠ qj
lo and the nadir point is easy to determine only (see Ehrgott and 
Tenfelde-Podehl 2000) in the case of bi-criteria problems (for continuous 
models; for discrete models the determination of a nadir point is some-
what simpler). 
No matter which ranges of criteria we use, in reference point approaches 
we assume that all criteria or quality indicators – and their values qjk for 
decision options k є K - are scaled down to a relative scale by the transfor-
mation:3 
qjk
r
 = (qjk - q
lo
j)/(q
up
j - q
lo
j)*100% (3) 
We assume that such a transformation is performed and will not later indi-
cate the upper index r, stipulating that all further values of quality indica-
tors are measured in a common, relative percentage scale – although in 
some examples we can modify this assumption, provided all criteria are 
measured in relative scales. 
4) Reference points as tools of holistic learning. While some decision 
theorists are likely to point out that a decision maker can be mistaken in 
specifying her/his reference point, another basic assumption of reference 
point approaches is that those reference (aspiration, reservation) points are 
treated not as fixed expression of preferences but as a tool of adaptive,    
holistic learning about the decision situation as described by the substan-
tive model. Thus, even if the convergence of reference point approaches to 
a solution best preferred by the decision maker can be proved (Wierzbicki 
1999), this aspect is never stressed; more important aspects relate to other 
properties of these approaches. Even if the reference points might be de-
termined in some objective fashion, independently of the preferences of the 
decision maker, we stress again a diversity of such objective determina-
tions, thus making possible comparisons of resulting ranking lists. 
                                                     
3 Moreover, it is consistent with measurement theory, see Barzilai (2004) - who 
points out that all utility and value theory in this respect is not necessarily     
consistent with measurement theory. 
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5) Achievement functions as ad hoc approximations of value. Given 
the partial information about preferences (the partial order in the space of 
criteria) and their assumed nonlinearity, and the information about the po-
sitioning of reference points inside known criteria ranges, the simplest ad 
hoc approximation of nonlinear value function consistent with this infor-
mation and promoting balanced solutions can be proposed. Such ad hoc 
approximation takes the form discussed later, see Eq. (4), (5), of so called 
achievement functions. Achievement functions are determined essentially 
by max-min terms that favour solutions with balanced deviations from ref-
erence points and express the Rawlsian principle of justice (concentrating 
the attention on worst off members of society or on issues worst provided 
for, see Rawls 1971); these terms are slightly corrected by regularizing 
terms, resulting in the efficiency (Pareto optimality) of solutions that maxi-
mize achievement functions. 
6) Sovereignty of the decision maker. It can be shown (Wierzbicki 
1986) that achievement functions have the property of full controllability, 
This means that any Pareto optimal solution4 can be selected by the deci-
sion maker by modifying reference points and maximizing the achievement 
function; this provides for the full sovereignty of the decision maker. Thus, 
a DSS based on reference point approach behaves analogous to a perfect 
analytic section staff in a business organization (Wierzbicki 1983). The 
CEO (boss) can outline his preferences to her/his staff and specify the ref-
erence points. The perfect staff is not afraid to tell the boss that her/his as-
pirations or even reservations are not attainable, if this is the case; but the 
staff computes in this case also the Pareto optimal solution that comes 
closest to the aspirations or reservations. If, however, even the aspirations 
of the boss are attainable and not Pareto optimal (a better decision might be 
found), the perfect staff is not afraid (nor too lazy) to present to the boss 
just the decision that results in the aspirations; the staff presents also a    
Pareto optimal decision5 corresponding to a uniform improvement of all   
                                                     
4 In fact, when using the regularized achievement function (5) with ε > 0, only any 
ε-properly Pareto optimal solution, i.e., any Pareto optimal solution with trade-
off coefficients bounded by 1 + 1/ε; for sufficiently small ε, this means almost 
any properly Pareto optimal solution, see (Wierzbicki 1986), (Wierzbicki et al. 
2000). However, for achievement functions with ε = 0, supplemented by nu-
cleolear optimization (Ogryczak 2006) which is easy for discrete problems, full 
controllability of any Pareto optimal solution is achieved. 
5 This distinguishes the reference point approaches from a similar set of goal    
programming approaches that minimize a distance form the reference point 
(goal). Since a distance is not a monotone function (it changes from decreasing 
to increasing when passing zero), special tricks are needed to secure Pareto op-
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criteria over the aspirations. In a special case, when the boss is lucky (or 
experienced and intuitive) enough to specify aspirations or reservations 
that are Pareto optimal, the perfect staff responds with the decision that   
results precisely in attaining these aspirations (reservations) – and does not 
argue with the boss that another decision is better, even if such a decision 
might result from a trade-off analysis performed by the staff. Only a com-
puterized DSS, not a human staff, can behave in such perfect fashion. 
7) Final aims: intuition support versus rational objectivity. To 
summarize the fundamental assumptions and philosophy of reference point 
approaches, the basic aim of such approaches when supporting an individ-
ual, subjective decision maker is to enhance her/his power of intuition (see 
Wierzbicki 1997) by enabling holistic learning about the decision situation 
as modelled by the substantive model; the same applies, actually, when   
using reference point approaches for supporting negotiations and group   
decision making, see (Makowski 2005). Another basic aim, discussed in 
one of next sections, might be the support of objective rankings in situa-
tions needing rational objectivity. 
Basic features of reference point approaches 
The large disparity between the opposite ends of the spectrum of prefer-
ence elicitation – full value or utility identification versus a weighted sum 
approach – indicates the need a middle-ground approach, simple enough 
and easily adaptable but not too simplistic. We mentioned above that the 
reference point approach requires the specification of reference (aspiration 
and reservation) levels for each criterion. After this specification, the     
approach uses a relatively simple but nonlinear aggregation of criteria by 
an achievement function that can be interpreted as an ad hoc and adaptable 
approximation of the value function of the decision maker based on the   
information contained in the estimates of the ranges of criteria and in the 
positioning of aspiration and reservation levels inside these ranges. 
In order to formulate an achievement function, we first count achieve-
ments for each individual criterion by transforming it (piece-wise linearly) 
e.g. in the case of maximized criteria as shown in Eq. (4). The coefficients 
α and β in this formula are typically selected to assure the concavity of this 
function, see (Wierzbicki and al. 2000); but the concavity is needed only 
for problems with a continuous (nonempty interior) set of options, for an 
easy transformation to a linear programming problem. In a ranking prob-
                                                                                                                         
timality in goal programming, while maximizing an achievement function (that 
must be monotone by definition) in reference point approaches results always 
in Pareto optimality, without the necessity of special tricks 
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lem with a discrete and finite set of options, we can choose these coeffi-
cients to have a reasonable interpretation of the values of the partial 
achievement function. 
                                      1 + α (qj - q
a
j)/(q
up
j - q
a
j),   if q
a
j ≤ qj ≤ q
up
j , 
σj(qj, q
a
j, q
r
j) =  (qj – qrj)/(qaj – qrj),                   if qrj ≤ qj < qaj ,  
                                      β (qj – q
r
j)/(q
r
j – q
lo
j),            if q
lo
j ≤ qj < q
r
j . 
 
(4) 
The value σj(qjk, q
a
j, q
r
j) of this achievement function for a given         
decision option k є K signifies the satisfaction level with the quality indica-
tor or criterion j for this option. If we assign the values of satisfaction from 
-1 to 0 for qloj ≤ qj < q
r
j, values from 0 to 1 for q
r
j ≤ qj < q
a
j, values from 1 
to 2 for qaj ≤ qj ≤ q
up
j, then we can just set α = β = 1.  
After this transformation of all criteria values, we might use then the 
following form of the overall achievement function:  
σ(q, qa,qr, ε) = min j є J σj(qj, q
a
j, q
r
j)+ ε ∑ j є J σj(qj, q
a
j, q
r
j) (5) 
where q = (q1,...qj,...qJ) is the vector of criteria and q
a = (q1
a,...qj
a,...qJ
a), 
q
r
 = (q1
r,...qj
r,...qJ
r) correspondingly the vectors of aspiration and reserva-
tion levels, while ε > 0 is a small regularizing coefficient. The achievement 
values σk = σ(qk, q
a,qr, ε) for all k є K can be used either to optimize them 
or to order the options in an overall ranking list, starting with the highest 
achievement value.  
The formulae (4), (5) do not specify the only form of an achievement 
function; there are many possible forms of such functions as shown in 
(Wierzbicki et al. 2000). All of them, however, have an important property 
of partial order approximation: their level sets approximate closely the 
positive cone defining the partial order (Wierzbicki 1986). 
Another property of the formulae (4), (5) is the dependence of the slopes 
of achievement functions on the situation of aspiration and reservation lev-
els qaj, q
r
j in the range of objective values [q
lo
j, q
up
j], which might be inter-
preted as a dependence of implied weighting coefficients on the currently 
specified reference points or a way of progressive elicitation of prefer-
ences. This property is shared with other more advanced forms of 
achievement functions, see (Wierzbicki et al. 2000) and (Luque et al. 
2007).  
As indicated above, the achievement function has also a very important 
theoretical property of controllability, not possessed by utility functions 
nor by weighted sums: for sufficiently small values of ε, given any point 
q* in the (proper) Pareto set of criteria values related to nondominated op-
tions (such as the third option in the Korhonen paradox), we can always 
choose such reference levels - in fact, it suffices to set aspiration levels 
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equal to the components of q* - that the maximum of the achievement 
function (5) is attained precisely at this point. Conversely, if ε > 0, all 
maxima of achievement function correspond to Pareto optimal (nondomi-
nated) options, similarly as in the case of utility functions and weighted 
sums. 
As noted above, precisely this controllability property results in a fully 
sovereign control of the decision support system by the user. Alternatively, 
as shown by (Ogryczak 2006), we can assume ε = 0 and use nucleolar 
minimax approach. In this approach we consider first the minimal, worst 
individual criterion achievement σk computed as in (4), (5) with ε = 0; if, 
however, two options k1 and k2 (or more of them) have the same achieve-
ment value, we order them according to the second worst individual        
criterion achievement, and so on. We can use this approach also for     
ranking of the options according to the achievement values , or also for 
classification. In the latter case, we must first split the interval of achieve-
ment values, say, [-1; 2], into a given number of subintervals, preferably of 
equal length ∆σ, say, ∆σ = 0.3 with 10 subintervals. Then we classify the 
options as approximately equivalent (belonging to the same class) if their 
worst individual criterion achievements σk computed as in (4), (5) belong 
to the same subinterval. If we use ε = 0 and nucleolar minimax approach, 
we must check additionally if the second worst (or even third worst)        
individual criterion achievements for options belonging to one class differ 
not more than ∆σ; if they differ more, they remain in the same class but 
subdivided into two new subclasses, etc. 
3. The issue of objective ranking 
We switch now to a different issue of objective ranking; we assume here 
that X0 is a set of discrete alternatives and the problem is how to rank these 
alternatives using multiple criteria and their aggregation. 
This is a classical problem of multi-attribute decision analysis; how-
ever, all classical approaches – whether of (Keeney and Raiffa 1976), or of 
(Saaty 1982), or of (Keeney 1992) – concentrate on subjective ranking. By 
this we do not mean intuitive subjective ranking, which can be done by any 
experienced decision maker based on her/his intuition,6 but rational      
                                                     
6 One of the authors of this chapter bought and used in his life well over 10 cars 
and never applied any decision support for this task, trusting more in his ex-
perience and the power of intuition. When he tried to convince the minister of 
science in Poland that they should use a decision support system for ranking of 
scientific research grants, the minister (himself also a professor) answered “I 
was elected to this high political function because my intuition is good enough 
to decide without any computerized decision support”. See also (Wierzbicki 
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subjective ranking, based on the data relevant for the decision situation – 
however, using an approximation of personal preferences in aggregating 
multiple criteria. 
And therein is the catch: in many practical situations, if the decision 
maker wants to have a computerized decision support and rational ranking, 
she/he does not want to use personal preferences, prefers to have some   
objective ranking. This is often because the decision is not only a personal 
one, but affects many people – and it is usually very difficult to achieve an 
intersubjective rational ranking, accounting for personal preferences of all 
people involved. This obvious fact is best illustrated by the following     
example. 
Suppose an international corporation consists of six divisions A,…, F. 
Suppose, for simplicity, that we are considering only these six units,    
without additionally specifying problems related to these units (which will 
be subject of the next example). Suppose these units are characterized by 
diverse data items, such as name, location, number of employees etc.   
However, suppose that the CEO of this corporation is really interested in 
the following attributes classified as criteria:  
o profit (in %),  
o market share (m.share, in % of supplying a specific part of market, e.g. 
global market for specific type of memory chips),  
o internal collaboration (i.trade, in % of revenue coming from supplying 
other divisions of the corporation), and  
o local social image (l.s.i., meaning public relations and the perception of 
this division – e.g., of its friendliness to local environment - in the soci-
ety where it is located, evaluated on a scale 0-100 points);  
All these criteria are maximized, improve when increased. An example 
of decision table of this type is shown in Table 1, while Pareto optimal 
(nondominated) divisions are distinguished by mark *.  
The CEO obviously could propose an intuitive, subjective ranking of 
these divisions – and this ranking might be even better than a rational one 
resulting from the table above, if the CEO knows all these divisions in 
minute detail. However, when preparing a discussion with his stockhold-
ers, he might prefer to ask consultants for an objective ranking. 
 
                                                                                                                         
1997), (Wierzbicki and Nakamori 2006) on the rational explanation of the 
power of intuition. However, there are situations when we need a rational 
analysis of possible decisions; between such situations, many require objective 
ranking, that is, ranking independent from personal preferences. 
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Division c1:  
name 
c2: 
location 
c3: 
employ-s 
q1: 
profit 
q2: 
m.share 
q3: 
i.trade 
q4: 
l.s.i. 
A Alpha USA 2500 11 % 8 % 10 % 40 
B* Beta Brasilia 7500 23 % 40 % 34 % 60 
C* Gamma China 4500 16 % 50 % 45 % 70 
D* Delta Dubai 500 35 % 20 % 20 % 44 
E* Epsilon Europe 3500 18 % 30 % 20 % 80 
F Fi France 1200 12 % 8 % 9 % 30 
Table 1. An example of a multicriteria decision table7 
Here we must add some philosophical comments on subjectivity and   
objectivity. The destruction of the industrial era episteme (see Wierzbicki 
2005, Wierzbicki and Nakamori 2007) – sometimes called not quite      
precisely positivism or scientism - started early, e.g., since Werner Heisen-
berg (Heisenberg 1927) has shown that not only a measurement depends 
on a theory and on instruments, but also the very fact of measurement    
distorts the measured variable. This was followed by diverse philosophical 
debates, summarized, e.g., by Van Orman Quine (Quine 1953) who has 
shown that the logical empiricism (neo-positivism) is logically inconsistent 
itself, that all human knowledge “is a man-made fabric that impinges on 
existence only along the edges”. This means that there is no absolute      
objectivity; however, this was quite differently interpreted by hard         
sciences and by technology, which nevertheless tried to remain as objec-
tive as possible, and by social sciences which, in some cases, went much      
further to maintain that all knowledge is subjective – results from a        
discourse, is constructed, negotiated, relativist, depends on power and 
money, see, e.g., (Latour 1990). This has led to a general divergence of the 
episteme – the way of constructing knowledge - of the three different    
cultural spheres (of hard and natural sciences, of technology, and of social 
sciences and humanities), see (Wierzbicki and Nakamori 2007). 
Thus, full objectivity is obviously – after Heisenberg and Quine – not   
attainable, but in many situations we must try to be as much objective as 
possible. This concerns not only technology that cannot advance without 
trying to be objective and, in fact, pursues Popperian falsificationism (see 
Popper 1972) in everyday practice when submitting technological artifacts 
to destructive tests in order to increase their reliability – while postmodern 
social sciences ridicule falsificationism as an utopian description how    
science develops. However, objectivity is needed also – as we show here – 
in management. 
                                                     
7 The data in this Table are consciously distorted, any similarity to an actual cor-
poration is not intended. 
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For an individual decision maker, this might mean that she/he needs 
some independent reasons for ranking, such as a dean cannot rank the 
laboratories in her/his school fully subjectively, must have some reason-
able, objective grounds that can be explained to entire faculty, see the next 
example. For a ranking that expresses the preferences of a group, diverse 
methods of aggregating group preferences might be considered; but they 
must be accepted as fair – thus objective in the sense of intersubjective 
fairness - by the group. 
However, it is not obvious how to define the grounds of an objective 
ranking and how such an objective ranking might be achieved. In multiple 
criteria optimization, one of similar issues was to propose compromise   
solutions, see, e.g., Zeleny (1974); however, such solutions depend too 
strongly on the assumed metric of the distance from the utopia or ideal 
point. We propose here to define objective ranking as dependent only on a 
given set of data, agreed upon to be relevant for the decision situation, and 
independent of any more detailed specification of personal preferences 
than that given by defining criteria and the partial order in criterion 
space. 
Given set of data might be such as in Table 1, or a bigger set of data    
including much more detailed characteristics of the divisions A,…, F;   
generally, any selected data information system, see (Pawlak 1991). The 
specification of criteria and their partial order (whether to minimize, or 
maximize them) can be also easily be agreed upon, be objective in the 
sense of intersubjective fairness. 
It is also not obvious how an objective ranking might be achieved. This 
is because almost all the tradition of aggregation of multiple criteria     
concentrated on rational subjective aggregation of preferences and thus 
ranking, see (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944), usually addressed as 
either a full identification and aggregation of value and utility functions, 
see (Keeney and Raiffa 1976, Keeney 1992), or as identification of weight-
ing coefficients under the assumption of aggregation by a weighted sum, 
e.g., as in the AHP method, see (Saaty 1982). While we could try, in the 
sense of intersubjective fairness, identify group utility functions or group 
weighting coefficients, both these concepts are too abstract to be reasona-
bly debated by an average group (imagine a stockholder meeting trying to 
define their aggregate utility function under uncertainty). Thus, neither of 
these approaches is easily adaptable for rational objective ranking. 
The approach that can be easily adapted for rational objective ranking is 
reference point approach as described above - because reference levels 
needed in this approach can be either defined subjectively by the decision 
maker, or established objectively statistically from the given data set. We 
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can use this approach also not for objective ranking, but for objective    
classification, using methods as indicated above with objectively defined 
reference points.  
We show below how to apply this approach for the simple example 
given in Table 1. Recall that we denote by qjk the value of a criterion or 
quality indicator qj for the decision option k є K. The achievement values 
σk = σ(qk, q
a
,q
r
, ε) for all k є K can be used to order the options in an over-
all ranking list, starting with the highest achievement value. Now, the 
question is: how to define aspiration and reservation levels in order to   
obtain rational objective ranking? Several ways were listed in (Granat et 
al. 2006): neutral, statistical, voting; we shall concentrate here on statisti-
cal determination. 
A statistical determination of reference levels concerns values qmj that 
would be used as basic reference levels, an upward modification of these 
values to obtain aspiration levels qaj, and a downward modification of 
these values to obtain reservation levels qrj; these might be defined as       
follows: 
q
m
j = ∑k є K qjk /|K |; q
r
j = 0.5 (qj
lo
 + qmj);  
q
a
j = 0.5(qj
lo
 + qmj ) ∀j є J  
(6) 
where |K | denotes the number of alternative options, thus qmj are just      
average values of criteria in all set of alternative options, aspiration and 
reservation levels – just averages of these averages and the lower and     
upper bounds, respectively. However, there are no essential reasons why 
we should limit the averaging to the set of alternative options ranked; we 
could use as well a larger set of data in order to define more adequate (say, 
historically meaningful) averages, or a smaller set – e.g., only the Pareto 
optimal options denoted by * in Table 1 – in order to define, say, more 
demanding averages and   aspirations. If the data set is much larger than in 
this illustrative example, we can use, e.g., evolutionary multiple objective 
optimization (see Deb 2001, Wierzbicki and Szczepański 2003) for an ap-
proximation of the Pareto set. 
For the data from Table 1, we can thus present two variants of objective 
ranking: A – based on averages of data from this table; B – based on aver-
ages from Pareto optimal options – see Table 2. Note that the more de-
manding ranking B displays a rank reversal: the divisions C and E, occu-
pying positions 2 and 3 in ranking A, exchange their places in ranking B. 
This is, however, a natural phenomenon: average aspirations favour stan-
dard though good solutions, truly interesting solutions result from          
demanding aspirations. Note also that the rank reversal disappears if,      
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instead of ranking, we classify the divisions into three classes: I: very 
good, II: good, III: wanting – both divisions C and E remain in the class II.  
 
Criterion q1 Q2 Q3 q4    
Upper bound 35 % 50 % 45 % 80    
Lower bound 11 % 8 % 9 % 30    
Reference A (average) 19.17% 26 % 23 % 54    
Aspiration A: 27.08% 38 % 34 % 67    
Reservation A 15.08% 17 % 16 % 42    
Reference B (average 
Pareto) 
23.0% 35.0% 29.75% 63.5    
Aspiration B 29.0% 42.5% 37.37% 71.7    
Reservation B 17.0% 21.5% 19.37% 46.7    
Ranking A: Division σ1 σ2 σ3 σ4 σ Rank Class 
A -1.00 -1.00 -0.857 -0.167 -1.304 5 III 
B 0.660 1.23 1.00 0.760 +1.02 1 I 
C 0.077 2.00 2.00 1.231 0.608 2 II 
D 2.00 0.143 0.222 0.087 0.332 4 II 
E 0.243 0.619 0.222 2.00 0.530 3 II 
F -0.755 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.375 6 III 
Ranking B: Division σ1 σ2 σ3 σ4 σ Rank Class 
A -1.00 -1.00 -0.904 -0.363 -1.326 5 III 
B 0.500 0.881 0.813 0.532 0.773 1 I 
C -0.167 2.00 2.00 0.932 0.309 3 II 
D 2.00 -0.111 0.035 -0.162 0.014 4 II 
E 0.083 0.405 0.035 2.00 0.335 2 II 
F -0.830 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.383 6 III 
Table 2 An example of objective ranking and classification for the data from  
Table 1 (ε =0.1; A: average reference levels, B: Pareto average reference levels) 
In some management applications the worst ranked options are the most 
interesting, because they indicate the need of a corrective action. Objective 
ranking was originally motivated by an actual application8 when evaluating 
scientific creativity conditions in a Japanese research university, JAIST, 
see (Tian et al. 2006). The evaluation was based on survey results. The 
survey included 48 questions with diverse answers and over 140 respon-
dents with diverse characteristics: school attachment (JAIST consists of 
                                                     
8 Actually, it is misleading to call it an application; a real life problem was first 
solved innovatively, which motivated later the development of theory. This   
often happens in technology development: technology is not necessarily and 
not only an application of basic natural science, it often precedes theoretical 
developments – such as invention of a wheel preceded the concept of a circle. 
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three schools), nationality (Japanese or foreign – the latter constitute over 
10 % of young researchers at JAIST), research position (master students, 
doctoral students, research associates etc.). In total, the data base was not 
very large, but large enough to create computational problems.  
The questions were of three types. The first type was assessment     
questions, assessing the situation between students and at the university; 
the most critical questions of this type might be selected as those that cor-
respond to worst responses. The second type was importance questions,     
assessing importance of a given subject; the most important questions 
might be considered as those that correspond to best responses. For those 
two type of questions, responders were required to tick appropriate          
responses in the scale vg (very good), g (good), a (average), b (bad), vb 
(very bad) – sometimes in an inverted scale if the questions were nega-
tively formulated. The third type was controlling questions, testing the   
answers to the first two types by indirect questioning revealing responder 
attitudes or asking for a detailed explanation.  
Answers to all questions of first two types were evaluated on a common 
scale, as a percentage distribution (histogram) of answers vg – g – a – b – 
vb. It is good if there are many answers specifying positive evaluations 
very good and good, and if there are only few answers specifying negative 
evaluations bad and very bad. The interpretation of the evaluation average 
was almost bad; if we want most answers to be very good and good, we 
admit only a few answers to be average. Therefore, in this case J = G UB, 
G = {vg, g}, B = {a, b, vb}; the statistical distributions (percentage histo-
grams) of answers were interpreted in the sense of multiple criteria optimi-
zation, with j є G  = {vg, g} as positive outcomes (quality indicators that 
should be maximized) and j є B = {a, b, vb} as negative outcomes (quality 
indicators to be minimized). 
A reference point approach was proposed for this particular case of 
ranking probability distributions; other approaches are usually more com-
plicated (see, e.g., Ogryczak and Ruszczyński 2001). However, when the 
dean of the School of Knowledge Science in JAIST, himself a well known 
specialist in multiple criteria decision support, was asked to define his 
preferences or preferred aspiration levels, the reality of the managerial 
situation overcome his theoretical background: he responded in this case, I 
want the ranking to be as objective as possible – I must discuss the results 
with the deans of other schools and with all professors. This was the origin 
of reflection on objective versus subjective rational ranking. 
Thus, a statistical average of the percentages of answers in the entire 
data set was taken as the reference distribution or profile. Since it was    
realized that such a reference profile might result in good but standard    
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answers, some artificial reference distributions were also constructed as 
more demanding than the average one; averages over Pareto optimal      
options were not computed because of the complexity of the data set. 
The detailed results of the survey were very interesting theoretically, but 
also very useful for university management, see (Tian et al. 2006). It was 
found that seven questions of the first (assessment) type ranked as worst 
practically did not depend on the variants of ranking, on the schools or on 
the characteristics of respondents; thus, the objective ranking gave robust 
results as to the problems that required most urgent intervention by the 
university management. The best ranked questions of the second (impor-
tance) type were more changeable, only three of them consistently were 
ranked among the best ones in diverse ranking profiles. Moreover, a rank 
reversal phenomenon was observed: if the average reference distribution 
was used, best ranked were questions of rather obvious type, more interest-
ing results were obtained when using more demanding reference profile. 
4. Conclusions 
We presented here some of the basic assumptions and philosophy of 
reference point approaches, stressing their unique concentration on the 
sovereignty of the subjective decision maker. Between new developments 
in reference point approaches we stress, however, also objective ranking 
defined as dependent only on a given set of data, relevant for the decision 
situation, and independent of any more detailed specification of personal 
preferences than that given by defining criteria and the partial order in 
criterion space. Rational objective ranking can be based on reference point 
approach, because reference levels needed in this approach can be estab-
lished objectively statistically from the given data set. Examples show that 
such objective ranking can be very useful in many management situations.  
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